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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States alone, the legal services industry generated over $250
billion in revenue in 2013 and is projected to generate $280 billion in 2018.'
Individuals, businesses, and governments pay a significant price in
attorneys' fees to make themselves whole again or defend from outside
claims.2 Under the American Rule, win or lose, each party pays its own
attorneys' fees.3 However, under the British Rule, the losing party always
pays the prevailing party's attorneys' fees.4 The United States and Japan are
the only countries that follow the American Rule, while the rest of the world
follows the British Rule.
1. Legal Services Industry in the US - Statistics & Findings, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/topics/2137/legal-services-industry-in-the-us/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2018).
2. See Christopher Hill, Reminder: Construction Litigation is Expensive, Be Sure
It's Worth It, CONSTRUCTION L. MUSINGS - RICHMOND, VA (Aug. 19, 2013),
http://constructionlawva.com/reminder-construction-litigation-expensive-be-sure-its-
worth/.
3. See, e.g., Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275, 281
(Md. 2008); St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 568 A.2d 35, 35 (Md.
1990).
4. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 518 (1994); see also Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney
Fees: An Empirical Study ofPublic Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 327, 337
(2013) (stating that the British Rule may encourage lawsuits by optimistic parties).
5. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 n.1 (1982) (stating that Japan has many restrictions
to the American Rule for the prevailing tort plaintiff).
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The United States is one of two countries in the world that does not allow
the prevailing party to recover attorneys' fees, although parties in the United
States contract out of the American Rule sixty-percent of the time.6 These
clauses are known as "fee-shifting" provisions and are hotly debated before
signing a contract.7 Few exceptions apply to the American Rule, but one
primary exception - contracting out of the American Rule - will be
addressed throughout this comment.'
This Comment focuses on fee-shifting provisions in construction contracts
and, primarily, on the decision in James G. Davis Construction Corp. v.
HRGM Corp.9 because this case deviates from the foundations of the
American Rule.'o This case became even more important after the decisions
in Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc." and Bainbridge
St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint Express Realty Group
Limited Partnership, LLLP.12 The aforementioned cases establish that when
there are two indemnity provisions, one specifying third-party claims and
one referring to "any and all claims," the unspecified "any and all" language
now includes first-party claims.' 3 However, if a defendant wishes to argue
the intent of the contract, ambiguity must be found within the contract.14
With no ambiguity, it is a simple question of fact, not a question of law, and
the fact-finder will make the plain language determination of a contract's
meaning. 1
6. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 328, 332, 353 (stating that parties contract
out of the American Rule more than any other dispute clause at a rate of sixty-percent,
while parties contract into arbitration about eleven-percent of the time and contract out
of a jury trial about twenty-percent of the time).
7. See id. at 330-31 (arguing that what a person does when he or she enters a
contract sheds light on what public policy should be because entering into a contract is
mutually beneficial and would therefore provide the most social welfare, and because
people contract out of the American Rule sixty-percent of the time, maybe the American
Rule is not necessary); Fee-Shifting, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8. See generally Nova Research, Inc., 952 A.2d at 280 (stating that contract clauses
allowing payment of the prevailing party's attorneys' fees are generally valid); St. Luke
Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 568 A.2d at 39-40 (noting an exception to the
American Rule).
9. 147 A.3d 332 (D.C. 2016).
10. Id. at 341 (holding for first-party fee-shifting without explicitly stating first-party
in the contract provision).
11. 861 F.3d 267 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
12. 164 A.3d 978 (Md. 2017).
13. See id. at 979; Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 269; James G. Davis
Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 340-41.
14. See Merriam v. United States, 107 U.S. 437, 441 (1883) (stating that the
contract's plain language controls unless there is ambiguity in the contract).
15. Wash. Props., Inc. v. Chin, Inc., 760 A.2d 546, 548 (D.C. 2000) (stating that
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To understand fee-shifting provisions, it is necessary to begin with the
basics of contract formation, negotiation, and interpretation.' 6 It is also
imperative to understand the context in which fee-shifting provisions are
applied, in this case, within a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA").17 Although
the D.C. Court of Appeals may have departed from traditional indemnity law
jurisprudence, it is crucial to grasp the precedent to understand where courts
may go in the future." Finally, in the shadow of James G. Davis
Construction Corp., Maryland and D.C. ruled on subsequent cases:
Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC and Hensel Phelps
Construction Co., portraying that it may not be necessary to explicitly state
first-party claims in an indemnity provision to allow for first-party
recovery.' 9  Therefore, these three cases together provide guidance on
indemnity law within Maryland and D.C.
II. FROM FORMATION TO JUDGMENT
A contract's creation, negotiation, performance, and conclusion are all
equally important.2 0 This section provides foundational elements of contract
formation, contract interpretation by courts, JVAs, and indemnity and fee-
shifting provisions. It also reviews the relevant Maryland and D.C. case law
in the area of fee-shifting.
A. Formation of a Contract
To create a legally binding contract, there must be an offer, consideration,
and acceptance of the offer. 2' An offer is defined as a manifestation of intent
whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law and the determination is outside that
of a jury).
16. Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275,283 (Md. 2008)
(stating that the plain meaning of a contract is preferred to the court attempting to
determine the intent of the parties).
17. See James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 341 (stating that under a joint
venture agreement parties wish to shift risk and attorney fee-shifting is part of the shifting
of risk).
18. See id at 334 (allowing first-party indemnification even though it was not
explicitly called for in the contract).
19. See Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc., 861 F.3d 267, 269 (D.C.
Cir. 2017); Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint Express
Realty Grp. L.P., 164 A.3d 978, 979 (Md. 2017).
20. Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 708-09 (Md. 2007) (citing Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Ass'n v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 499-503 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)) (holding
that all of these components are necessary to avoid an invalid contract).
21. See id. at 708; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (stating that an offer to the terms of a contract invites the offeree to bind the
offeror to the terms stated in the contract); id. § 50 (stating that an "[a]cceptance of an
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22to be bound to the terms of an agreement. For valid consideration, the
terms of the contract must be bargained for. 23 An acceptance of an offer may
be done in any way specified by the offer,24 but there must be mutual assent
to the terms of the contract. 25
Mutual assent is comprised of two main elements: (1) intent that parties
be bound, and (2) the contract terms.26 A contract does not require the intent
to be bound to be legally binding, but expressly stating that a contract is not
legally binding will prevent the formation of a contract. 27 A contract must
specify the definiteness of the terms to the contract, meaning a contract must
state what each party to the contract is responsible for accomplishing. 28
However, if the parties fail to agree on all of the contract's essential terms
the contract may be void, especially if the parties did not intend to be bound
until all essential terms of the contract were agreed upon.29
B. Contract Interpretation in Maryland and D.C.
Courts in Maryland and D.C. apply an objective interpretation to
contracts: if no ambiguity exists in the contract, the court will apply the plain
meaning of the contractual terms30 and interpret the contract as a reasonably
prudent person would.3' Ambiguity does not arise because two parties differ
on the meaning of a contract or a specific contract provision, but the court
must decide whether a term or provision is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.32 To interpret a contract, courts will look to the
offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms" of the contract).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24; see id. § 24 cmt. a (explaining
that an acceptance of the offer will bind with offeree without further action).
23. See id. § 71 cmt. c (requiring both parties to benefit from the contract, but not
necessarily to the same extent).
24. Id. § 30.
25. See Cochran, 919 A.2d at 713; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 18.
26. Cochran, 919 A.2d at 708.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21.
28. Cochran, 919 A.2d at 708.
29. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27.
30. Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275, 283 (Md. 2008)
(citing Diamond Point Plaza L.P. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 929 A.2d 932, 951 (Md.
2007)) (stating that an objective interpretation of contracts applies the plain meaning of
the contract terms when no ambiguity exists with the terms); Rivers & Bryan, Inc. v.
HBE Corp., 628 A.2d 631, 635 (D.C. 1993).
31. Cochran, 919 A.2d at 710 (citing Walton v. Mariner Health, 894 A.2d 584, 594
(Md. 2006)).
32. Diamond Point Plaza L.P., 929 A.2d at 952.
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words of the contract in its entirety,33 and the court will not sever any part of
the contract unless no other course of action would be sensible. 3 4
Additionally, the court will not look outside the plain language of contract
formation without ambiguity.35
If contract language is ambiguous, the courts must determine the intent of
the parties.36 A contract is ambiguous if, when looking at the plain language
of the contract, a reasonable person could conclude more than one meaning
of that contract. 37 If determined to be ambiguous, the contract will be
interpreted against the drafter. 38 Additionally, industry specific and defined
terms within a contract are given greater weight in contract interpretation
than generic and general language.39 When ambiguity arises, the courts must
determine the intent of the parties and to do so, courts may look not only to
the terms of the contract, but also to "the subject matter and surrounding
circumstances."40
C. Joint Venture Agreements
A JVA is an agreement between two or more parties where the parties
combine resources to achieve the terms of the contract.4 ' Under the
agreement, the total amount of property, money, or skill that is contributed
by each party is generally split evenly, but different percentages can be
determined by the agreement.42 While a party may be contractually required
to perform or provide for a certain percentage of a contract, it is impossible
to determine the actual amount of property, money, or skill that was provided
by a specific party.43 While the duties of an agreement may be divided, each
33. Nova Research, Inc., 952 A.2d at 283.
34. Sagner v. Glenangus Farms, Inc., 198 A.2d 277, 283 (Md. 1964) (explaining that,
if a contract provision is illogical or senseless in the context of the entire contract, a court
can read out that contract provision).
35. Dyer v. Bilaal, 983 A.2d 349, 354-55 (D.C. 2009).
36. Id. at 355.
37. Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 710 (Md. 2007).
38. Martin & Martin, Inc. v. Bradley Enters., Inc., 504 S.E.2d 849, 851 (Va. 1998)
(stating that wherever ambiguity arises, it must be interpreted against the drafter of the
contract).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(c) (Am. LAW INST. 1981).
40. Merriam v. United States, 107 U.S. 437, 441 (1883) (stating that surrounding
circumstances can help shed light on the intent of the parties at the time the contract was
entered into).
41. RICHARD W. MILLER, JOINT VENTURES IN CONSTRUCTION 1 (3d ed.)
https://suretyinfo.org/pdf/JointVentures.pdf (last visited June 12, 2018) (stating that the
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party to the joint venture is liable for the entirety of the contract; if one party
defaults, the other parties must complete the project. 44
Despite the potential liability arising from JVAs, they come with several
advantages. 45  A JVA allows contractors to spread out risk, combine
specialized abilities, and increase bid accuracy.4 6 It may also allow a
contractor to bid projects bigger than its capacity, and, most importantly,
allow contractors to pool talent, resources, and financing.47
Three prominent types of JVAs include an integrated joint venture, non-
integrated joint venture, and a combination joint venture.48 An integrated
joint venture is typically used when the parties involved have a strong
relationship and the project is non-linear. 49 A non-integrated joint venture is
typically used where there is a limited relationship between the parties and
the work has a definite scope.o Slightly different in its creation, a
combination joint venture is used when one party has more property, money,
or skill than the other party or parties and where the project is large and
complex.'
D. Indemnity and Fee-Shifting Provisions
Indemnity provisions are common in many contracts and shift the liability
from one party to another.5 2 Indemnification can generally cover two types
of claims: first-party claims and third-party claims.53 A first-party claim
involves a claim from a party that is involved with the contract, while a third-
party claim involves a party not privy to the base contract between the first
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Ms. Kale, V.V. et al., Joint Venture in Construction Industry, J. MECHANICAL &
Civ. ENGINEERING, 60-61 (2017), http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jmce/papers/sicete
(civil)-volume3/3 6.pdf (last visited June 12, 2018).
47. Id.
48. See id. (presenting two other types of JVAs: (1) an equity joint venture where
two or more parties create a new corporate entity, each gaining an owning portion of
equity; and (2) a contractual joint venture where there is no equity participation between
the parties and the agreement is completely governed by contracts).
49. Id. at 60.
50. Id.
51. See id at 60-61 (stating that a combination joint venture agreement is
appropriate when one party is particularly good at a certain aspect of the project and the
other party is able to handle the general aspects of the project).
52. Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. Hermes, 765 F.2d 306, 316 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Indemnity
obligations, whether imposed by contract or by law, require the indemnitor to hold the
indemnitee harmless from costs in connection with a particular class of claims.").
53. Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275,286 (Md. 2008)
(citing Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. Hermes, 765 F.2d 306, 316 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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parties.5 4 Therefore, a first-party claim involves a claim with someone who
has contract privity; while a third-party claimant does not have contract
privity with both parties to the original contract.5 5
Fee-shifting provisions, or indemnification, may greatly impact pre-
litigation decision-making because of the costs associated with litigation.5 6
Therefore, there are six general theories surrounding fee-shifting
provisions.5 7 First, fee-shifting provisions provide fairness through the Rule
of Indemnity.58  Second, fee-shifting provisions provide compensation for
the legal injury or the lawsuit.59 Third, fee-shifting can be used punitively.60
Fourth, private attorneys generally argue that lawsuits are for the benefit of
society as a whole, and it should not matter who bears the cost of attorneys'
fees because the lawsuit's outcome benefits the whole. 6' Fifth, involving
the relevant strength of the parties involved, deals with cases that have one
party with significantly more resources than the other party. 6 2 Sixth, the
economic incentives theory deals with the decision making process to engage
in litigation or settle the suit. 63 While there are many theories on fee-shifting
provisions, the courts have adopted the American Rule; a policy decision to
provide the greatest societal impact by having each party pay its attorneys'
fees, unless otherwise provided for by contract.64
The two legal rules for fee-shifting provisions and attorney's fees
indemnification are the American Rule and the British Rule. 65 Under the
American Rule, the prevailing party may never recover attorneys' fees
unless:
54. See id. at 287-88.
55. Id. (claiming that a subcontractor is one example of a third-party claimant).
56. Rowe, supra note 5, at 653.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 653-54 (claiming that the prevailing party, having been in the right, should
not have to pay to fees associated with the lawsuit).
59. Id. at 657-58 (stating that making the loser pay the winners attorneys' fees goes
to putting the winner in the position they would have been in without the lawsuit).
60. Id. at 660 (stating that this fee-shifting is based on unjustifiable or undesirable
behavior, and providing the prevailing party with attorneys' fees makes the undesirable
behavior more expensive.).
61. Id. at 662 (providing that lawsuits that benefit society should be encouraged, and
therefore the prevailing party should recover fees for such suits).
62. Id. at 663-64 (proposing the idea that leveling the playing field in litigation is
sometimes necessary to come to a just outcome).
63. Id. at 665-66 (suggesting that economic incentives are necessary to increase or
decrease the number of cases that are litigated).
64. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994) (stating that parties are
generally responsible for their own attorneys' fees).
65. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 328-29.
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(1) [T]he parties to a contract have an agreement to that effect, (2) there is
a statute that allows the imposition of such fees, (3) the wrongful conduct
of a defendant forces a plaintiff into litigation with a third party, or (4) a
plaintiff is forced to defend against a malicious prosecution. 66
This is deeply rooted in the common law, and therefore, the United States
Supreme Court will not deviate from the American Rule.67 However, a court
may award attorneys' fees at its discretion, as justice requires. 68  The
American Rule stands in stark contrast to the British Rule.69 Under the
British Rule the court automatically awards attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party. 70
E. Prior Precedent - Redundant? Maybe Not
On October 6, 2016, in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC,
the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision that an indemnity
provision did not expressly call for the recovery of first-party attorneys' fees,
but instead stated the terms "all claims," which the court interpreted to
include first-party fees.' While the D.C. courts were interpreting Maryland
law in James G. Davis Construction Corp., Maryland later adopted D.C.'s
James G. Davis Construction Corp. holding in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda
LLC and solidified it as good law.72
66. St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 568 A.2d 35, 39 (Md.
1990); see also Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275, 281
(Md. 2008) (reinforcing the American Rule applied in St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran
Church, Inc.).
67. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015); Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 271 (1975) ("[The American
Rule] is deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to
invade the legislature's province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner
suggested by respondents and followed by the Court of Appeals.").
68. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (stating that justice may require the awarding
of attorneys' fees when opposing party has acted with the purpose of oppression or in
bad faith).
69. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 518 (1994) (stating that under the
American Rule each party is responsible for their own attorneys' fees while under the
British Rule, the prevailing party recovers attorneys' fees).
70. Id.
71. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 340 (D.C. 2016).
72. See Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda LLC v. White Flint Exp. Realty Grp. L.P.,
164 A.3d 978, 979 (Md. 2017) (citing James G. Davis Constr. Corp., v. HRGM Corp.,
147 A.3d 332, 340-41) ("[Cloncluding that the plain language of an indemnification
provision containing an express reference to attorneys' [sic.] fees and an unqualified




1. Atlantic Contracting & Material Co. v. Ulico Casualty Company
In Ulico Casualty Company73 a surety was able to recover first-party
attorneys' fees because the court found that, in the context of sureties, it is
common practice to recover first-party attorneys' fees. Ulico Casualty
Company ("Ulico"), a surety company, issued a performance and surety
bond to Atlantic Contracting & Material Company ("Atlantic") guaranteeing
Atlantic's performance on a road repair project. 74 Atlantic failed to pay for
equipment repair from Clearwater Hydraulics and Driveshaft Services
("Clearwater"), and Clearwater, together with Ulico, filed a claim for
payment.5 Ulico filed a claim against Atlantic seeking all costs paid to
Clearwater, as well as the attorneys' fees incurred pursuing the
indemnification claim against Atlantic.76 The indemnification agreement
within the performance and surety bond read that Atlantic "indemniflied]
[Ulico] from and against any and all Loss," and further defined loss to mean
"any and all damages, costs, charges, and expenses of any kind" and allowed
for the recovery of attorneys' fees.
The Maryland Court of Appeals provided that "it is standard practice for
surety companies to require contractors for whom they write bonds to
execute indemnity agreements by which principals and their individual
backers agree to indemnify sureties against any loss they may incur as a
result of writing bonds on behalf of principals."7 ' The court of appeals
accepted the trial court's reasoning that "[i]ndemnity agreements of this kind
are interpreted generally to entitle the surety to recover fees, costs, and
expenses incurred in enforcing them." 7 9 Therefore, the court found that
Ulico was entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees under the language in the
indemnification agreement because, in the context of a surety, it would be
senseless for a surety to enter into a contract in which the surety lacks the
ability to make itself whole if a contractor defaults on the surety bond.so
73. 844 A.2d 460 (Md. 2004).
74. Ulico Cas. Co., 844 A.2d at 463; see also id. at 468 (stating that "a surety bond
is a three-party agreement between a principal obligor, an obligee, and a surety," and that
under this agreement a surety guarantees the obligee the performance of the contract if
the principal fails to perform).
75. Id. at 463.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 469.
78. Id. at 468.
79. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 468, 479.
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2. Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.
Nova Research, Inc. ("Nova Research") leased a tractor and trailer from
Penske Truck Leasing Company ("Penske").' The rental agreement
provided that Penske would provide liability insurance to Nova Research.8 2
Nova Research further agreed to "indemnify, and hold harmless Penske, its
partners, and their respective agents ... from and against all loss, liability
and expenses caused or arising out of [Nova Research's] failure to comply
with the terms of this Agreement."83 The agreement further defined loss as
"[a]ny and all damages, costs, charges, and expenses of any kind, sustained
or incurred by [the indemnified party] in connection with or as a result of:
(1) the furnishing of any Bonds; and (2) the enforcement of this
Agreement. 84
On May 24, 2002, the rented truck was involved in a fatal car accident
where both drivers were killed." Nova Research breached the rental
agreement because the person driving the truck was not a registered driver
with Penske.86 Therefore, Penske filed a claim, enforcing the agreement
against Nova Research for all costs associated with the wrongful death
claim. 7 The court held that Penske was not entitled to attorneys' fees for
enforcing the agreement (the first-party claim), but was entitled to attorneys'
fees for defending against the third-party wrongful death action." The court
declined to extend an exception to the American Rule when a contract reads
"no express provision for recovering attorney's fees in a first-party action
establishing the right to indemnity."8 9 Allowing this exception would
destroy the American Rule and the British Rule would quickly take over.90
81. Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275, 278 (Md.
2008).
82. Id. (stating that the agreement provided that "[Penske] shall, at its sole cost,
provide liability protection for Customer and any operator authorized by Penske, and no
others ... " .
83. Id. at 279 (explaining that Penske wished to provide insurance up to a certain
point, but for Nova Research to indemnify Penske if Nova Research did not comply with
the terms of the agreement).
84. Id. at 283.
85. Id. at 279.
86. Id. at 281.
87. Id. at 442.
88. Id. at 286 (holding that "a contract provision must call for fee recovery expressly
for establishing the right to indemnity in order to overcome the application of the
American Rule.").
89. Id. at 285 (citing Jones v. Calvin B. Taylor Banking Co., 253 A.2d 742, 748 (Md.
1969)).
90. Id. at 285 ("If we were to imply a fee-shifting provision for first party actions,
even where the contract does not permit one expressly, the exception would swallow the
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F. The New Wave of Indemnity
On October 6, 2016, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
decision that an indemnity provision included first-party fees even though it
did not expressly call for the recovery of first-party attorneys' fees, but
instead included the terms "all claims" which included first-party fees.9 '
While the Court in James G. Davis Construction Corp. shifted away from
the traditional American Rule, the courts in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda
Apartments LLC and Hensel Phelps Construction Co. solidified this shift
away from the American Rule.92
1. James G. Davis Construction Corp. v. HRGM Corp.
The court in James G. Davis Construction Corp. allowed recovery of first-
party attorneys' fees when the contract did not specifically call for the
recovery of first-party attorneys' fees. 93  In August 2002, commercial
construction companies James G. Davis Construction Company and HRGM
Corporation entered a JVA to renovate McKinley Technical High School.94
The agreement was set up as a combination joint venture, with Davis as the
managing venturer. 95 The project was completed in 2006 and was valued at
over $53 million.96 HRGM raised several issues about Davis's management
of the project and when Davis sent HRGM a letter stating that HRGM owed
the joint venture over $100,000 in unpaid capital contributions, HRGM filed
suit "alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and a
full and complete accounting." 97 The trial court found for HRGM. 98 The
issue on appeal was whether the indemnification clauses in the JVA were
contradictory, ambiguous or rather expressly stated for the recovery on first-
rule, and the presumption of the American rule disallowing recovery of attorney's fees
would, in effect, be gutted.").
91. James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 334, 340, 342
(D.C. 2016).
92. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint Express Realty
Grp. L.P., 164 A.3d 978, 986 n. 6 (Md. 2017); Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Cooper Carry
Inc., 861 F.3d 267, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
93. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 334.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 334 (stating that Davis was responsible for eighty percent of the project
and eighty percent of the profits while HRGM was responsible for twenty percent of the
project and twenty percent of the profits).
96. Id. at 335.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 335-36 (providing a standard punitive damages jury instruction, which
allowed the jury to consider any attorneys' fees that have incurred in the case and which
ultimately led the jury to award HRGM $5,056 in compensatory damages, $70,500 in
punitive damages, $736,152.76 in attorneys' fees, and $39,344.67 in costs).
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party claims. In a post-trial motion, HRGM requested $808,692.50 in
attorneys' fees and $75,530.29 in costs based on Article XXI of the JVA. 99
The two relevant indemnity provision sections were Articles XXI
(contested) and XVI (uncontested).' 00 Article XVI stated that the parties
agreed to indemnify each other for the "loss or losses directly connected with
the performance of the Construction Contract."' 0 ' Both parties agreed that
Article XVI only applied to the third-party claims.10 2
On appeal, the court held that Article XXI extended to first-party claims
because of the unqualified language of "any breach" in Article XXI and the
language of Article XVI applying only to third-party claims.'0 3 The court
reasoned that this fact-pattern was more analogous to Atlantic Contracting
& Material Co. than Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co.1 04
because (1) Article XXI included broad language; (2) Davis breached the
JVA; and (3) the language "any and all" claims was included.'0 5 Therefore,
the court held Davis responsible for the attorneys' fees.1 0 6
The trial court reduced HRGM's attorneys' fee request by $70,000
because the jury may have considered attorneys' fees in its punitive damages
award. The goal in awarding punitive damages was to produce an award that
would punish Davis's conduct. 0 7 Having found no reversible error, the court
of appeals held that because the JVA used broad language and a specific
third-party only provision, Davis was responsible for the attorneys' fees
incurred by HRGM.'os
99. Id. at 336.
100. Id. at 341.
101. Id. at 340.
102. Id. at 341.
103. Id. at 340-41.
104. Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275 (Md. 2008).
105. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 348; Nova Research, Inc., 952 A.2d
at 275 (holding that a defendant may not be responsible for attorneys' fees when the
plaintiff is establishing the right to indemnity); Atl. Contracting & Material Co. v. Ulico
Casualty Co., 844 A.2d 460, 477 (Md. 2004) (stating that the breaching party may be
responsible for attorneys' fees when the breaching party breaches the contract that
included a provision for fees).
106. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 348.
107. Id. at 337, 339 (stating that Davis contended that the court erred in granting the
post-trial motion because the jury considered attorneys' fees in the punitive damages
award, and that HRGM was required to prove attorneys' fees as an element of damages
and they failed to do so).
108. Id. at 340-41, 343, 348.
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2. Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc.
In Hensel Phelps Construction Co., the D.C. Court of Appeals held that,
because the JVA's indemnification provision did not specifically address
first-party claims, the agreement did not encompass first-party claims.' 09
D.C. applies an objective interpretation of a contract and the terms of the
contract, if unambiguous, govern the rights of parties."o Therefore, a
contract must be interpreted as a whole - "giving effective meaning to all
its terms.""' Specifically, the D.C. Court of Appeals applies a strict
construction of indemnification clauses, as to avoid "any obligations which
the parties never intended to assume" while still applying an objective
interpretation to achieve the parties intent of the contract terms.112
HQ Hotels acquired all rights and responsibilities from Marriott, and
entered into a design build agreement with Hensel Construction, which fully
encompassed the original contract between Marriott and Cooper Carry." 3
The relevant fee-shifting provision - which Cooper Carry acknowledged
- read:
Marriott may sustain financial loss for which [Cooper Carry] may be liable
if the Project or any part thereof is delayed because [Cooper Carry]
negligently fail[ed] to perform the Services in accordance with this
agreement, including, but not limited to, the Schedule. 114
Cooper Carry also agreed to indemnify Marriott (including attorneys' fees)
as "a result of, in connection with, or as a consequence of Cooper Carry's
performance of the Services under this agreement.""' Thus, Hensel was
assigned the contract." 6
The court reasoned that, even though the language of the indemnification
provision was broad, it did not specifically include first-party claims or
appear to intend first-party claims, and therefore the provision did not expand
to first-party claims."'7  The court noted the holding in James G. Davis
Construction Corp.:
109. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc., 861 F.3d 267, 275 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 131 A.3d 886, 894-
95 (D.C. 2016)).
112. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. v. L'Enfant Plaza Props., 655 A.2d 858, 861 (D.C. 1995).
113. HenselPhelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 270-71 (stating that the original contract
was converted into a design build contract).
114. Id. at 270.
115. Id.
116. Id. at270-71.
117. Id. at 275.
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[R]eading an indemnification clause covering 'any and all costs and
expenses' to reach first-party claims by looking to a second
indemnification clause protecting only against 'loss or losses directly
connected with the performance of the Construction Contract' and
reasoning the parties purposely chose a broader formulation for the clause
at issue." 8
The court, citing specifically to James G. Davis Construction Corp., adopted
James G. Davis Construction Corp.'s holding in the state of Maryland.
3. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint
Express Realty Group Limited Partnership, LLLP
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the indemnity provision
expressly provided for attorneys' fees in a first-party indemnification
action.1 9 The issue on appeal was whether the court undermined the clarity
in Nova Research regarding the limited circumstances where a contractual
indemnity provision is read as a first-party fee-shifting provision, overriding
the American Rule.1 20 The relevant indemnity provision stated:
Bainbridge hereby indemnifies, and agrees to defend and hold harmless
White Flint ... from any and all claims, demands, debts, actions, causes
of action, suits, obligations, losses, costs, expense, fees, and liabilities
(including reasonable attorney's fees, disbursements, and litigation costs)
arising from or in connection with Bainbridge's breach of any terms of
this Agreement or injuries to persons or property resulting from the Work,
or the activities of Bainbridge or its employees, agents, contractors, or
affiliates conducted on or about the White Flint Property, including
without limitation, for any rent loss directly attributable to any damage to
the White Flint Property, caused by the construction of the Project,
however Bainbridge shall not be liable for matters resulting from the
negligence or intentional misconduct of White Flint, its agents,
employees, or contractors. The indemnification obligations set forth
herein shall service the termination of this Agreement indefinitely.121
The circuit court for Montgomery County read this agreement to include
first-party claims because the indemnity provision called for specific
damages that could only be first-party claims, and, therefore, all first-party
118. Id. (citing James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 340-
41 (D.C. 2016)).
119. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint Express Realty
Grp. L.P., 164 A.3d 978, 979, 981 (Md. 2017) (relying on the list of claims in the contract
that included claims that could only be first-party claims, e.g. rent loss).
120. Id. at 984-85; Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275,
287 (Md. 2008) (holding there is a significant difference between first- and third-party
claims and the recovery of attorneys' fees under each).
121. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 981.
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claims must be included in interpreting the contract.1 2 2 The court of appeals
upheld the court of special appeals' holding and reiterated that this decision
does not undermine the clarity provided in Nova Research because the
indemnity provision in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC
contained express terms whereas the contract in Nova Research did not.1 23
The court in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC found that the
indemnity agreement expressly provided for attorneys' fees and that
payment of those fees was tied to the breach of contract.1 24 Therefore,
attorneys' fees were paid because there was a breach of contract.1 25
III. THE EXPANSION OF INDEMNITY
The D.C. Court of Appeals, in James G. Davis Construction Corp.,
misapplied the exceptions to the American Rule that allows the prevailing
party to recover attorneys' fees when it is explicitly stated in the contract.126
The contract should have been interpreted to only include third-party claims
because the indemnity provision did not explicitly call for first-party
claims.1 2 7 To make sure the court does not place an unintended burden on a
party, "contractual attorney's fee provisions must be strictly construed to
avoid inferring duties that the parties did not intend to create."1 28 A broad
interpretation of the provision would go against the well-established public
policy that each party is responsible for their own attorneys' fees.1 29 This
concept is imperative because if courts begin applying contracts improperly,
122. Id. at 982 n. 3.
123. See id. at 983; Nova Research, Inc., 952 A.2d at 286-88.
124. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 986.
125. Id. at 983-84.
126. See Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164-65 (2015);
Alveska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975); Nova
Research, Inc., 952 A.2d at 281 (stating that, under the American Rule, the prevailing
party may never recover attorneys' fees unless: "(1) the parties to a contract have an
agreement to that effect, (2) there is a statute that allows the imposition of such fees, (3)
the wrongful conduct of a defendant forces a plaintiff into litigation with a third party, or
(4) a plaintiff is forced to defend against a malicious prosecution."). But see James G.
Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 336 (D.C. 2016) (awarding first-
party attorneys' fees when the contract did not specially state for the recovery of first-
party attorneys' fees).
127. See James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 336.
128. Nova Research, Inc., 952 A.2d at 287 (citing ROBERT L. Rossi, ATTORNEYS'
FEES § 9:18 (3d ed. 2002, Cum. Supp. 2007) (stating that courts should not put duties
into a contract that the parties did not actually intend when the contract was formed); see
also Baker Botts L.L.P., 135 S. Ct. at 2171 (2015) (stating that the Supreme Court will
not deviate from the American Rule unless there a contract includes a specific and
explicit provision agreeing to the British Rule).
129. See Baker Botts L.L.P., 135 S. Ct. at 2164.
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or implying unwarranted duties into the contract, the cost of basic goods and
services will increase due to the inevitable litigation driven by the courts'
inconsistent interpretations of indemnity provisions.3 Parties will see an
opportunity to either make themselves whole (a valid claim) or gain money
or property above and beyond what they are contractually due (an invalid
claim). 131
The dispute resolution clause is important because it will likely impact the
outcome of a settlement or litigation: "[s]erious consequences may result
from a failure to negotiate the dispute resolution provision of a [JVA]. . . ."132
Likely, the contractual terms were highly debated prior to signing, and
should therefore be given the weight they deserve.' 33
A. Modern Cases Applied to Modern Cases: Confusion
1. James G. Davis Construction Corp. applied to Hensel Phelps
Construction Co. v. Copper Carry and Bainbridge St. Elmo
Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint
The D.C. Court of Appeals held in James G. Davis Construction Corp.
that a prevailing party will be granted attorneys' fees, even without expressly
calling for first-party fee-shifting, when one indemnity provision calls for
awarding attorneys' fees for "any and all claims" and the other provision
specifically calls for fee-shifting in third-party claims. 3 4 While this is a
limited holding that narrowly fits within the confines of Nova Research the
court in James G. Davis Construction Corp. moved closer to undermining
the meaning of the American Rule by allowing first-party recovery even
though first-party recovery was not expressly stated in the contract.1 35
The holding in James G. Davis Construction Corp., applied to Hensel
Phelps Construction Co., would not allow fee-shifting for a first-party claim
because in the Hensel Phelps-Cooper Carry agreement there was only one
130. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 335-36 (stating that the English
rule increases the risk of additional costs to litigants).
131. See id. (stating that litigants could work to avoid paying litigation expenses).
132. Ian A. Laird & Randa Adra, JVAgreements and the Dispute Resolution Clause:
5 Useful Points to Consider, INSIDE COUNSEL, (Nov. 19, 2014) https://www.law.com/insi
decounsel/2014/11/19/jv-agreements-and-the-dispute-resolution-clause-5/?slretum=201
80008225316.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(c) (AM. LAwINST. 1981) (stating
that specific and exact terms of a contract are given greater weight than that of general
terms).
134. James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 341 (D.C. 2016)
(stating that if the parties wished to only include third-party claims, then the parties
should have used the same language from the third-party only provision).
135. See id. at 342.
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broad fee-shifting provision where Cooper Carry agreed to indemnify Hensel
Phelps (including attorneys' fees) from anything in connection with Cooper
Carry's performance of the contract.' 36 The court in Hensel Phelps
Construction Co. reasoned that, even though the indemnification provision
was broad, a court could not imply first-party fee-shifting unless it is
expressly stated in the contract. 3 7 This suggests that the two holdings are in
conflict with each other. The court in Hensel Phelps Construction Co.
further limited the holding in James G. Davis Construction Corp. when it
stated that:
[A]n indemnification clause covering "any and all costs and expenses" to
reach first-party claims by looking to a second indemnification clause
protecting only against 'loss or losses directly connected with the
performance of the Construction Contract' and reasoning the parties
purposely chose a broader formulation for the clause at issue.1 38
In its statement, the court in Hensel Phelps Construction Co. suggested that
the "any and all" language used in the second indemnification provision in
James G. Davis Construction Corp., alone, would not allow for first-party
recovery absent a separate indemnification provision that had significantly
broader language than the other.1 39
While the contract in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC
provided a list of claims that included first and third-party claims, there was
only one indemnification provision.1 4 0 Therefore, the holding in James G.
Davis Construction Corp. should not apply to Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda
Apartments, LLC because the Hensel Phelps Construction Co. court limited
the holding to apply only to cases where two indemnification contracts were
present in the agreement.141 However, the court in Bainbridge St. Elmo
Bethesda Apartments, LLC reasoned that the James G. Davis Construction
Corp. court held that "the plain language of an indemnification provision
containing an express reference to 'attorney's fees' and an unqualified
reference to 'any breach,"' [sic.] allowed for first-party fee-shifting."1 4 2
Hence, the interpretations of James G. Davis Construction Corp. by the
courts in Hensel Phelps Construction Co. and Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda
136. See Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc., 861 F.3d 267, 272 (D.C.
Cir. 2017).
137. Id. at 275.
138. Id. (citing James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 341).
139. Id.
140. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint Express Realty
Grp. L.P., 164 A.3d 978, 987, 989 (Md. 2017).
141. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 275 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
142. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 986 n.6.
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Apartments, LLC are conflicting and the meaning of the American Rule is in
flux because each of these cases interprets the James G. Davis Construction
Corp. holding differently.1 43
2. Hensel Phelps Construction Co. applied to James G. Davis
Construction Corp. and Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda
Apartments, LLC
The court in Hensel Phelps Construction Co., in declining to expand the
scope of the American Rule, interpreted the holding of James G. Davis
Construction Corp. to mean that when "no clear and unequivocal intent to
include first-party claims appears on the face of the instrument . . . [the
agreement should be strictly construed]." 44 The court reasoned that, even
though the indemnification was broadly constructed, it did not specifically
call for first-party claims, and therefore fee-shifting in first-party claims
would not be allowed.1 4 5 This holding is clear and is consistent with the
jurisprudence regarding indemnity and fee-shifting in the DC-Maryland-
Virginia area.146
Hensel Phelps Construction Co.'s holding, applied to the facts of James
G. Davis Construction Corp., would not allow first-party attorneys' fees.147
Even with two separate indemnity provisions in James G. Davis
Construction Corp., one specifically stated that it only applied to third-party
claims and the other indemnity provision did not specifically call for first-
party claims.1 48 The language of the indemnification provision in Hensel
Phelps Construction Co. is very similar and as all-inclusive as the
indemnification provision at issue in James G. Davis Construction Corp.149
For example, the provision in Hensel Phelps Construction Co. included the
terms "claim, judgment, lawsuit, damage, liability, and costs and expenses,"
which is very similar to the "any and all" language in James G. Davis
Construction Corp., yet the court in Hensel Phelps Construction Co. did not
143. See id. at 987; Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 275.
144. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 275.
145. See id.
146. See Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275, 282 (Md.
2008) (holding that unless the provision explicitly states first-party and attorneys' fees,
fee-shifting in first-party claims will not be allowed); Atl. Contracting & Material Co. v.
Ulico Cas. Co., 844 A.2d 460, 472-73 (Md. 2004) (holding that, in the surety context,
indemnification clauses will be interpreted broadly).
147. Compare Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 275, with James G. Davis
Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 341-42 (D.C. 2016).
148. See James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 341-42.
149. See Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 275; James G. Davis Constr. Corp.,
147 A.3d at 340.
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allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees in first-party claims." 0
3. Hensel Phelps Construction Co. applied to Bainbridge St. Elmo
Bethesda Apartments, LLC
Hensel Phelps Construction Co.'s holding, applied to the facts in
Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, would likely result in a
different outcome as well. The indemnity provision in Bainbridge St. Elmo
Bethesda Apartments, LLC provided "any and all" claims language and listed
a series of claims that could both be first and third-party claims, without
specifically referencing either first- or third-party claims.'' Therefore,
without specific reference to first-party claims, the Hensel Phelps
Construction Co. court would have not broadened the exceptions to the
American Rule and would have found that there should be no fee-shifting
allowed in the first-party claim.' 52
The court in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC held that
first-party fee-shifting provisions were included in the provision because it
listed both first- and third-party claims, and therefore all first- and third-party
claims were covered.'5 3 The court further reasoned that because Bainbridge
held all the risk, it was necessary for White Flint to be made whole if
Bainbridge breached the contract.1 54
In applying the holding in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC
to James G. Davis Construction Corp., it is unlikely the outcome would be
different because the "any and all" language provided in Article XXI of the
James G. Davis Construction Corp. contract would allow first- and third-
party claims. 15 The rationale in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments,
LLC was simply that, because a first-party claim was listed, first-party
attorneys' fees were allowed to be recovered regardless of whether the claim
was specifically listed.1 5 6 As "any and all" presumably includes first- and
third-party claims, the recovery of attorneys' fees in a first-party claim would
likely be granted. 5 7
Similarly, in Hensel Phelps Construction Co., the indemnification
150. Compare Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 270, with James G. Davis
Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 336.
151. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint Express Realty
Grp. L.P., 164 A.3d 978, 981 (Md. 2017).
152. See Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 275 (holding that objective analysis
of the indemnification clause led to an interpretation only including third-party claims).
153. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 987, 989.
154. See id. at 986.
155. See James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 336.
156. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 988.
157. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 332, 336.
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agreement included broad terms, such as a "claim," which could be filed by
either a first- or third-party. 15 Following the court's reasoning in
Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, the "claim" would include
the recovery of attorneys' fees in a first-party claim because unqualified
claims were covered by the indemnification provisions in the contract. 159
However, if Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC's holding is
read more narrowly - that specific first- and third-party claims were listed,
and, therefore, all first- and third-parties could recover attorneys' fees -
then the unqualified claim would likely not include first-party recovery of
attorneys' fees.1 60
B. James G. Davis Construction Corp.: Ambiguity between Indemnity
Provisions
In James G. Davis Construction Corp., the D.C. Court of Appeals applied
Maryland law and, therefore, it was unclear how the Maryland courts would
interpret this decision.161 However, the Maryland Court of Appeals cited to
James G. Davis Construction Corp. in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda
Apartments, LLC, clarifying Maryland's interpretation.1 62 The court limited
the holding in James G. Davis Construction Corp. to include only express
references to attorneys' fees and "any and all" language.1 63 Though this
clarification provides guidance for future contracts, it does not provide a
rationale for deviating from requiring contracting parties to specifically
include first-party claims in their fee-shifting provisions.1 6 4
While the court in James G. Davis Construction Corp. rejected Nova
Research, Inc., one of Maryland's fundamental cases regarding fee-shifting
provisions, the court failed to provide reasoning for not connecting
attorneys' fees to first-party claims when the connection was not specifically
stating it in the contract.1 65 Furthermore, the court continued to include first-
158. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc., 861 F.3d 267, 275 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
159. Compare Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 980-8 1,
989 (stating that the reason for the recovery was the express provisions), with Hensel
Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 275 (using a traditional interpretation of indemnification
clauses to find that only third parties can recover).
160. See Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 989; Hensel
Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 275.
161. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 340.
162. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 986 (citing James
G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 340-41) (clarifying how
Maryland law would interpret the decision).
163. Id. at 986 n.6.
164. Id.
165. See James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 332 (addressing whether or not
2019 87
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESSLAWREVIEW
party recovery without the JVA expressly stating "first-party" even after it
acknowledged that courts have typically erred on the side of caution by not
including first-party recovery when it is called into question.'6 6 The court
reasoned that Nova Research does not bar the recovery of attorneys' fees
when "attorneys' fees" are specifically listed in the agreement.1 6 7 However,
the court failed to consider the effect of allowing fees recovery in this
situation and should not have extended first-party recovery. 6 8 1In allowing
the recovery of attorneys' fees in these types of situations, the court gutted
the meaning of the American Rule because the intent to include first-party
fees was not expressly stated in the contract.1 6 9
The James G. Davis Construction Corp. court's reasoning is logically
sound, but not legally rational; both parties agreed that Article XXI only
applied to third-party claims, so the court reasoned that broad language
included first-party claims, barring any ambiguity.17 0 However, the court
failed to apply the precedent and proceeded to allow a new exception to the
American Rule.' 7  The court stated that because Article XVI specifically
stated third-party claims and Article XXI listed "any and all claims," the
contract therefore allowed attorneys' fees recovery for first-party claims.1 7 2
The court further stated that if the parties wanted Article XXI to include only
third-party claims, the parties should have used language similar to that in
Article XVI, specifically stating third-party recovery.1 7 3 However, a court
cannot infer parties' intents and grant attorneys' fees to the prevailing party
unless the language is unmistakably clear.1 74 At the very least, the court
should have rendered Article XXI ambiguous because, without specifically
calling for the recovery of attorneys' fees in first-party claims, the court
first-party fee-shifting can take place without expressly stating for the recovery of
attorneys' fees in the contract).
166. Id. at 341-42 (citing Atl. Contracting & Material Co. v. Ulico Casualty Co. as
the only other case where first-party recovery was allowed without explicitly stated in
the contract); see also Atl. Contracting & Material Co. v. Ulico Cas. Co., 844 A.2d 460,
469 (Md. 2004) (allowing for a first-party surety to recover fees because in the surety
context, contracts are generally interpreted to allow the surety to recover fees and costs).
167. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 341-42.
168. See id at 342 (stating that Nova Research did not have the opportunity to address
whether first-party fees could be limited if the contract addresses attorneys' fees in first-
party claims).
169. Id.
170. See James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 341.
171. See id. at 345-46; Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P., 952
A.2d 275, 285 (Md. 2008).
172. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 341.
173. Id.
174. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3d 186, 199 (2d Cir. 2003).
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could not simply imply the intent of the parties. Additionally, the court
should have looked to the parties' intent at time of agreement. 7 5
The court erred in relying on the plain meaning of the contract and finding
no ambiguity in Article XXI.1 76 However, if ambiguity did exist and a
reasonably prudent person could find different meanings in the contract
terms, the intent of the contract could have been found in the interest of
justice. 7 7 When ambiguity does exist, the parties' intents are imperative and
the circumstances surrounding the agreement must be investigated or the
costs of attorneys' fees associated with the suit would fall on one party, even
if the parties intended to pay their own attorneys' fees. 7 1 While the
conclusion would likely have been the same because first-party indemnity
provisions are usually included in JVAs,1 7 9 the rationale would have limited
the effect of the holding on current and future contracts in that the court could
have limited the holding to the facts of the case.s0
C. Interpreting a Contract Within the Context of the Industry
The holding in James G. Davis Construction Corp. is analogous to the
holding of Atlantic Contracting, which allowed the surety to recover fees
and costs by a first-party action because "these types of agreements"
typically allow recovery, even though "attorneys' fees" were not specifically
referred to in the contract when dealing with a surety.'' Similarly, the
contract in James G. Davis Construction Corp. should be interpreted within
175. Dyer v. Bilaal, 983 A.2d 349, 354-55 (D.C. 2009) (stating that a court will not
look to the intent of the parties at contract formation unless there is some ambiguity with
the contract); Diamond Point Plaza L.P. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 929 A.2d 932, 952
(Md. 2007) ("A contract is not ambiguous simply because, in litigation, the parties offer
different meanings to the language. It is for the court, supposing itself to be that
reasonably prudent person, to determine whether the language is susceptible of more than
one meaning.").
176. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 341.
177. Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 709-10 (Md. 2007) (stating that courts will
not look to the intent of the parties without ambiguity).
178. See Merriam v. United States, 107 U.S. 437, 444 (1883) (holding that contracts
should be construed using the contract's language if the contract is ambiguous due to
surrounding circumstances); Martin & Martin, Inc. v. Bradley Enters. Inc., 504 S.E.2d
849, 851 (Va. 1998) (stating that wherever ambiguity arises, it must be interpreted
against the drafter of the contract so the result may have been the same in James G. Davis
Construction Corp.).
179. MILLER, supra note 41.
180. See kenerally James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d 332 (providing a broad
holding because attorneys' fees were not granted in the interest of justice, but because
the court stated the contract expressly provided for attorneys' fees).




the context of the construction industry to truly understand the meaning of
the contract and the intent of the parties. 8 2  Once determined to be
ambiguous, the court may look to the surrounding circumstances to
determine the intent of the parties.18 Under the intent of the parties theory,
there are two relevant and prevalent circumstances: (1) this contract is within
a JVA and (2) this contract is a JVA within the construction industry.18 4
Typically, JVAs include first-party and third-party fee-shifting provisions
because one party is jointly and severally liable for all actions taken by the
other venturer. 85 However, not every JVA includes first-party and third-
party fee-shifting. 8 6  Additionally, defendants may believe the cost of
litigation is the only deterrent to meritless lawsuits and harassment. 7
Therefore, courts generally apply a strict interpretation of indemnity
provisions because it is in the best interest of both parties and serves as a
deterrence against frivolous claims in the future as the cost associated with
the suit may increase or decrease based on the indemnity provision.'
However, because this contract is a JVA and because Davis was responsible
for eighty percent of the profits and potential liability, it is likely that Article
XXI could have been explicitly restricted to first-party claims because Davis
could have written "first-party" into the contract if that was Davis'
182. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 332.
183. Merriam, 107 U.S. at 441 (stating that the court may look to the subject matter
and the surrounding circumstances to determine the parties' intent at the contracts
inception).
184. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 488 A.2d 486, 488 (Md. 1985)
(stating that courts should looking at the character, the purpose, and the facts and
circumstances of the contract at the time of the contract's execution to determine the
intention of the parties).
185. See generally, Vincent Rowan, Working With a Joint Venture or Consortium
Contractor: Getting the Best Out of the Relationship, REED SMITH (Dec. 13, 2011),
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2011/12/working-with-a-joint-venture-or-
consortium-contrac (providing an overview of typical JVAs and the implications of joint
and several liability in such agreements).
186. See MILLER, supra note 41.
187. See D. Hull Youngblood, Jr. & Peter N. Flocos, Forget About Copy and Paste.
The Best Indemnification Provisions Start With the Details of the Transaction, THE PRAC.
L., at 24 (Aug. 2010), http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/4fff23fl-3315-4425-
b6ad-56e54bea55f0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fbalfaaa-91de-4849-8a8f-
6678elcad2b2/Youngblood FlocosPracticalLawyer.pdf ("Defendant may perceive
that only the cost of litigation stands between the defendant and harassment by a plaintiff
asserting meritless claims.").
188. See Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. v. L'Enfant Plaza Props., 655 A.2d 858, 861 (D.C.
1995) (stating that the D.C. Court of Appeals applies a strict construction of
indemnification clauses, as to avoid "any obligations which the parties never intended to
assume.").
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intention. 189
Generally, private parties contract out of the American Rule about sixty-
percent of the time,' 90 which allows a general contractor to reduce the overall
risk associated with a construction project.' 9' The most common indemnity
provision used in construction contracts can be found in American Institute
of Architects document 201A and "it identifies the contractor as the one
responsible for protecting [its] subcontractors, and other parties involve[ed]
in the contract, including agent, employees or any other related party against
claims, damages, losses, and expenses, including but not limited to attorneys'
fees."1 92 Being that the most popular indemnity provision does not include
first-party indemnification, it is not industry standard to include first-party
indemnifications in construction contracts.
While JVAs do allow for the combination of resources by two separate
companies, a combination JVA presents a unique issue.1 94  Having more
responsibility over the project, Davis likely wanted as much control as
possible to limit its possible liability. At the same time, as HRGM was only
receiving twenty-percent of the profit, it would want to limit its liability for
such a small profit.1 95 Furthermore, because Davis was responsible for
eighty-percent of the contract and drafted the contract, it therefore had more
negotiating power.1 9 6 If the court found ambiguity within the contract, it
189. James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 334, 348 (D.C.
2016).
190. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 331 (adding that parties contract into
arbitration about eleven percent of the time and contract out of a jury trial about twenty-
percent of the time).
191. See Juan Rodriguez, Indemnity Clauses in Construction Contracts, THE
BALANCE SMALL Bus. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/indennity-
agreements-844985 (stating that an indemnity provision allows a contractor to divert the
risk of the other first- or third-party claims because if anything were to happen, it would
only take time and not additional money to make the company whole again).
192. Id. (stating that this provision requires a subcontractor to indemnify the
contractor of any and all costs that arise from anything that subcontractor is in control
over).
193. See id. (providing that the most popular provisions do not include first-party fee-
shifting provisions because it is necessary for the parties to craft their own).
194. See Ms. Kale, V.V. et al., supra note 46, at 60-61 (stating that a combination
joint venture takes place when one party has more money or property and therefore has
provides more to the project and in turn receives a larger percentage of the profits and
liability); see also supra Part IIC.
195. See James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 334, 348 (D.C.





would have been interpreted against Davis as the drafter of the contract.1 9 7
Likely, regardless of the court's holding, the contract would likely have been
interpreted against Davis and in favor of HRGM because Davis drafted the
contract.1 98
While broad language is difficult to maneuver around - for example, the
"any and all" language in Article XXI of the JVA - the D.C. Court of
Appeals veered away from precedent regarding first-party recovery of
attorneys' fees.1 99 While similar to the indemnification provision in Nova
Research,20 0 the court in James G. Davis Construction Corp. found Nova
Research's holding inapplicable because attorneys' fees were explicitly
referred to within Article XXI of the agreement and Article XXI did not
specifically call for the recovery of first-party attorneys' fees.20 '
With Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC clarifying James G.
Davis Construction Corp.'s holding, the conclusion is not as undefined as it
once was; any language indicating "any and all" in reference to claims where
attorneys' fees could be recovered is a death trap for the failing party to a
claim because the failing party would be responsible for the oppositions
attorneys' fees.202 Article XXI of the Davis and HRGM Joint Venture
Agreement stated: "[e]ach Venturer shall indemnify and save harmless the
other Venturer and its affiliates, directors, employees and officers from and
against any and all claims . . . (including but not limited to reasonable
attorneys' fees)." 2 03 However, with attorneys' fees included in Article XXI,
the Davis contract could have met the requisite specificity to impose
attorneys' fees on the losing party.204 Therefore, the court likely provided a
sufficient and subtle distinction between the recovery and attorneys' fees and
197. Id. at 341.
198. Martin & Martin, Inc. v. Bradley Enterprises, Inc., 504 S.E.2d 849, 851 (Va.
1998) (stating that wherever ambiguity arises, it must be interpreted against the drafter
of the contract).
199. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 336.
200. 952 A.2d 275, 285 (Md. 2008) (presenting the top 400 contractors, by revenue,
in the United States).
201. Id. ("Where the contract provides no express provision for recovering attorney's
fees in a first-party action establishing the right to indemnity, however, we decline to
extend this exception to the American rule, which generally does not allow for prevailing
parties to recover attorney's fees.").
202. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint Express Realty
Grp. L.P., 164 A.3d 978, 986 n.6 (Md. 2017) (citing James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147
A.3d at 340-4 1).
203. James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 336.
204. See id. at 336; Zissu v. Bear, 805 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1986) (providing an
example of a case that did not meet the necessary level of scrutiny).
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the American Rule by including the "any and all" language. 205
As the court provided in a footnote in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda
Apartments, LLC, a subtle distinction arose:
[G]iven the language and structure of the clause and what it covers
specifically in terms of damages, some of them, not all of them, are only
first-party damages. It would make no sense ... in the same provision to
say, we're going to give your first-party type damages, but this clause
doesn't apply.206
If allowing the recovery of first-party fees was allowed without being
specifically stated within the contract, courts might as well adopt the British
Rule and award the prevailing party with any incurred attorneys' fees.207
James G. Davis Construction Corp., Hensel Phelps Construction Co., and
Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC illustrate that even though
many parties contract out of the American Rule, the default is moving closer
and closer to the British Rule, allowing parties to recover attorneys' fees
without specific contract provisions.20 8
D. What if there was only one Indemnity Provision?
In Hensel Phelps Construction Co., the D.C. Court of Appeals cited to the
holding in James G. Davis Construction Corp. to demonstrate that "any and
all" language alone may not allow for first-party recovery, stating that:
[R]eading an indemnification clause covering "any and all costs and
expenses to reach first-party claims by looking to a second
indemnification provision clause protecting only against 'loss or losses
directly connected with the performance of the Construction Contract' and
reasoning the parties purposely chose a broader formulation for the clause
at issue" and therefore no ambiguity exists because of the parties
deliberately used the language in the contract. 209
However, in Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, the Maryland
court, disagreed with James G. Davis Construction Corp.'s holding,2 10
205. See James G. Davis Constr. Corp., 147 A.3d at 336.
206. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 982 n.3 (relying on
the list of claims in the contract that included claims that could only be first-party claims,
e.g. rent loss and because one first-party claim is included in the list, the indemnity
provision intended to include the recovery of attorneys' fees in first-party claims).
207. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994); see also Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 4, at 327 (stating that the British Rule may encourage lawsuits by
optimistic parties).
208. See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 533; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 327.
209. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc., 861 F.3d 267, 275 (D.C. Cir.
2017).




"conclude[d] that the plain language of an indemnification provision
containing an express reference to 'attorney's fees' and an 'unqualified
reference to 'any breach,' allowed for first-party fee-shifting." 2 1' This
suggests that two jurisdictions who generally look to each other for guidance
have different interpretations of the holding in James G. Davis Construction
Corp.; D.C. would likely not allow for the recovery of first-party claims with
"any and all" language in the contract, whereas Maryland would likely allow
for the recovery of first-party claims.212 D.C., the jurisdiction in which the
case was decided, limited the James G. Davis Construction Corp. holding to
"all," which only includes first-party recovery when there is another
provision that specifically refers to third-party recovery. 2 13  However,
Maryland, in interpreting a D.C. case that interpreted Maryland law,
suggested that the holding is actually more broad than D.C. wishes to
acknowledge and the "any and all" language, in reference to attorneys' fees,
includes the recovery by first-parties, regardless of a second provision
explicitly allowing recovery by third-parties.2 14
Without the court finding that, as a matter of law, there was ambiguity in
the contract, the plain meaning must be interpreted and the question must be
presented to the fact-finder. 215  Therefore, at the outset of litigation,
ambiguity within the contract and the intent of the parties must be determined
for a court to provide an accurate ruling on the contract terms. 216 Without
ambiguity, the plain language will be read and interpreted.
IV. HOW TO DRAFT AN INDEMNITY PROVISION
IfJames G. Davis Construction Corp. sets the new standard, it is necessary
to reevaluate fee-shifting provisions and contracts generally. Fee-shifting
provisions are not the only essential elements of receiving or paying
attorneys' fees if the lawsuit is won or lost, respectfully; but it is necessary
to read the entire contract to determine if there is any possible plain language
211. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 486 n.6.
212. Barbara Bintliff, Mandatory v. Persuasive Cases, PERSPS.: TEACHING LEGAL
RES. AND WRITING, Winter 2001, https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/pe
rspec/2001-winter/winter-2001-7.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2019) (stating that "because
demographic, geographic, or historic similarities may have led to the development of
similar legal doctrines among neighboring states.").
213. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 861 F.3d at 275.
214. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC, 164 A.3d at 989.
215. Washington Props, Inc. v. Chin, Inc., 760 A.2d 546, 548 (D.C. 2000) (stating
that whether a contract is ambiguous is a question and the determination is outside that
of a jury).
216. Merriam v. United States, 107 U.S. 437, 444 (1883) (stating that the intent of the
parties is only necessary where ambiguity exists).
94 Vol. 8:1
AMERICAN V. BRITISH RULE
that could give the court any reason to infer that first-party claims are
included in the agreement.217 A contract should not have frivolous language;
an irrelevant provision can raise questions or change the meaning of another
contract provision. 2 18 Therefore, it is necessary to view the contract as a
whole, use consistent language, and determine what the client wants at the
outset.219
Indemnity provisions can act as a savior on one hand, but a death sentence
on the other. Once the client is aware of the problems that may arise with
including or not including first-party indemnity that includes attorneys' fees,
it is necessary to move forward with caution.2 20 If the client wishes to
include first-party recovery of attorneys' fees, it is necessary to make sure
that they are explicitly called for or that attorneys' fees are referenced with
respect to "any and all" claims.22 1
Additionally, it would be prudent to explicitly state that a provision
includes, or does not include, first-party claims. When this is not possible,
one must look for language in the contract that may give the court reason to
include first-party claims. At this point, it is unclear whether courts are
trying to expand the exceptions under the American Rule, but it appears they
are. If part of an indemnity provision may only apply to first-party claims,
it should be removed or further specified to only include third-party claims.
If there is more than one provision that applies to indemnification, it must be
clear that first-party claims are not included. This can be achieved by
intentionally leaving out first-party claims (including breach of contract,
which can only be a first-party claim). Though the American Rule still
applies in Maryland and D.C., courts are becoming more likely to increase
their definitions of 'expressed' by reading "any and all" language to include
first-party claims.
Indemnity provisions are in many contracts and the intent of the parties
should be understood by the plain reading of a contract whenever possible
because indemnity provisions could determine whether a lawsuit is brought
217. Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275,283 (Md. 2008)
(presenting that a court must look at the contract in its entirety, therefore in determining
how a court will look at a contract, attorneys must look to the entire contract document).
218. See id. at 283 (stating that a court will read the contract in its entirety to determine
its meaning); Sagner v. Glenangus Farms, Inc., 198 A.2d 277, 286 (Md. 1964) (stating
that the court will not read out any part of the contract).
219. Nova Research, Inc., 952 A.2d at 283.
220. MILLER, supra note 41.
221. James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 336 (D.C. 2016)
(holding that any and all language in reference to claims and attorneys' fees will hold a
losing first-party responsible for reasonable attorneys' fees).
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or whether a settlement is the more practical business decision. 22 2 However,
what is rarely understood is that the decision is made far before the time to
file suit and, therefore, the client must be aware of the seriousness of the
decision to include first- or third-party indemnity provisions. Once the client
has determined which path they wish to take, the safest option is to ensure
that the plain language of the contract supports the client's intent.
V. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the D.C. Court of Appeals likely
expanded the jurisprudence regarding first-party recovery of attorneys' fees.
However, currently this is the new standard and if the holding is not further
limited, it is necessary to increase the specificity of indemnity provisions in
contracts. Without specificity in contract terms that are consistent
throughout the entire contract, one term can alter the intent of the parties and
the plain language interpretation of the contract.
The construction industry is a relatively low percentage profit industry
and, therefore, the allocation of risk is important to control companies'
bottom lines. In many cases, especially large construction project claims,
attorneys' fees may be incredibly high. HRGM acquired over $800,000 in
fees and costs and the company was only responsible for twenty percent of
a $53 million project, roughly 10.6 percent of the revenue generated by the
contract.2 23 Therefore, the importance of fee-shifting provisions in contracts
cannot be overlooked.
222. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 333-34.
223. Id.
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